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ZERO-SUM REPEATED GAMES: COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE
EXISTENCE OF THE ASYMPTOTIC VALUE AND THE
CONJECTURE MAXMIN= LIMVN
By Bruno Ziliotto1
GREMAQ, Universite´ Toulouse 1 Capitole
Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Math-
ematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528–1577 Amer. Math.
Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the
first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum repeated game, the
asymptotic value exists, and the second one is that, when Player 1
is more informed than Player 2, in the long run Player 1 is able to
guarantee the asymptotic value. We disprove these two long-standing
conjectures by providing an example of a zero-sum repeated game
with public signals and perfect observation of the actions, where the
value of the λ-discounted game does not converge when λ goes to 0.
The aforementioned example involves seven states, two actions and
two signals for each player. Remarkably, players observe the payoffs,
and play in turn.
Notations. The notation “X := Y ” means “X is defined by the expres-
sion Y .”
The set of nonnegative integers is denoted by N, and N∗ :=N \ {0}. The
set of real numbers is denoted by R.
The complementary of B in A is denoted by A \B.
If x ∈R, the integer part of x is denoted by ⌊x⌋.
If (C,C) is a measurable space, we denote by ∆(C) the set of probability
measures on C, and ∆f (C) the set of probability measures on C with finite
support. We call δc the Dirac measure at c.
If C0 ⊂C is a finite set and (αc)c∈C0 ∈∆(C0), then we write
∑
c∈C0
αc · c
for
∑
c∈C αcδc.
If X is a bounded real random variable, E(X) is the expectation of X .
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If f :A→R is a bounded function, ‖f‖∞ is supx∈R |f(x)|, and if B ⊂A,
argmaxx∈B f := {x ∈B|∀y ∈Bf(x)≥ f(y)}.
If f :R→R is differentiable, dfdx is the derivative of f .
Let a ∈R and f , g and h be real functions. If f(x)−g(x) is little-o of h(x)
when x goes to a, we write f(x) =
x→a
g(x) + o(h(x)). If f(x) is equivalent to
g(x) when x goes to a, we write f(x) ∼
x→a
g(x).
Introduction. The general model of two-person zero-sum repeated game
was introduced in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994), Chapter IV. Such a
game is described by a finite set of states K, a finite set of actions I
(resp., J) for Player 1 (resp., 2), a finite set of signals A (resp., B) for
Player 1 (resp., 2), a payoff function g :K × I × J → R, and a transition
function q :K × I × J → ∆(K × A × B). The game proceeds as follows.
Before the game starts, a triplet (k1, a0, b0) is drawn according to an ini-
tial probability distribution p ∈∆(K × A×B). The state k1 is the initial
state, and Player 1 (resp., 2) receives the private signal a0 (resp., b0). At
stage m ≥ 1, both players choose an action simultaneously and indepen-
dently, im ∈ I (resp., jm ∈ J) for Player 1 (resp., 2). The payoff at stage
m is gm := g(km, im, jm). A triplet (km+1, am, bm) is drawn from the proba-
bility distribution q(km, im, jm). The signal am (resp., bm) is announced to
Player 1 (resp., 2). The game then moves on to state km+1, and enters the
next stage.
For λ ∈ (0,1], in the λ-discounted game, the goal of Player 1 (resp., 2)
is to maximize (resp., minimize) the expected Abel mean of stage payoffs∑
m≥1 λ(1−λ)m−1gm. For n ∈N∗, in the n-stage game, the goal of Player 1
(resp., 2) is to maximize (resp., minimize) the expected Cesaro-mean of stage
payoffs 1/n
∑n
m=1 gm. These two games have a value, denoted, respectively,
by vλ(p) and vn(p). Two important conjectures were stated by Mertens [see
Mertens (1987), page 1572 and Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994), Chap-
ter VIII, pages 378 and 386].
Conjecture 1. In a zero-sum repeated game, the asymptotic value
exists, that is, the sequences of functions (vn) and (vλ) converge pointwise
to the same limit, when n goes to infinity and λ goes to 0.
Conjecture 2. In a zero-sum repeated game where Player 1 is more
informed than Player 2 (i.e., Player 1 observes what Player 2 observes),
(vn) and (vλ) converge pointwise to the maxmin of the game, which is the
maximal amount that Player 1 can guarantee to herself in long games.
The Mertens’ conjectures have been proven true in numerous particular
classes of zero-sum repeated games [see Aumann and Maschler (1995), Bew-
ley and Kohlberg (1976), Gensbittel, Oliu-Barton and Venel (2014), Mertens
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and Neyman (1981), Mertens and Zamir (1971), Neyman (2008), Renault
(2006, 2012), Rosenberg (2000), Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2002, 2003,
2004), Rosenberg and Vieille (2000), Sorin (1984, 1985)].
In zero-sum repeated games with symmetric information [the particular
class of zero-sum repeated games in which players observe the actions per-
fectly and receive a public signal about the state, i.e., for allm ∈N∗, am = bm
and (im, jm) is am-measurable], Conjectures 1 and 2 were not proven [see
Forges (1982), Kohlberg and Zamir (1974), Venel (2015) for a proof of the
conjectures under additional assumptions on the transition function]. Note
that in this class of games, Player 1 has the same information as Player 2,
and in particular she is more informed than Player 2.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide an example of a zero-
sum repeated game with symmetric information where (vλ) does not con-
verge when λ goes to 0, thus contradicting both conjectures. Our example
also shows that there is no hope of obtaining an existence result for the
asymptotic value in zero-sum repeated games, unless we make a very strong
assumption on the transition function. Indeed, the structure of the exam-
ple is very simple: at each stage, the action of one player only influences
their stage payoff and the transition; moreover, players observe the payoff.
In addition, since the information is symmetric, the belief hierarchy [belief
of Player 1 about the state or actions played, belief of Player 2 about the
belief of Player 1 about the state or actions played, and so on; see Mertens
and Zamir (1985) for more details] is straightforward: players know the past
actions and have the same belief about the state.
In addition, using the example we will construct a second example of a
zero-sum repeated game with symmetric information where neither (vλ) nor
(vn) converge.
Lastly, we will provide an example of a state-blind zero-sum repeated
game (the particular class of zero-sum repeated games with symmetric in-
formation where players get no signals about the state) and an example of
a zero-sum repeated game with one state-blind player (one player observes
the state but the other gets no signal about it) without an asymptotic value.
We will also give an example of a standard zero-sum stochastic game with
compact action sets without an asymptotic value, providing an alternative
counterexample to Vigeral (2013). Note that this last class of zero-sum re-
peated games does not concern the two conjectures, since the action sets are
not finite. Nonetheless, the example is interesting because it has a simpler
structure than the one given in Vigeral (2013) (players play in turn) and is
thus easier to analyze.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we explain the model of
zero-sum repeated game with symmetric information and some basic con-
cepts. In Section 2, we present our main counterexample and show that (vλ)
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does not converge. In Section 3, we construct a similar game where nei-
ther (vλ) nor (vn) converge. In Section 4, we show how our counterexample
adapts to other classes of zero-sum repeated games.
1. Zero-sum repeated games with symmetric information.
1.1. The model. A zero-sum repeated game with symmetric information
Γ is defined by the following elements:
– State space K.
– Action set I (resp., J) for Player 1 (resp., 2).
– Signal set A.
– Transition function q :K × I × J →∆(K ×A).
– Payoff function g :K × I × J →R.
We assume K, I , J and A to be finite. Both players know K,I,J,A, g, q.
Given an initial probability p ∈∆(K) known by both players, the game
Γp proceeds as described below:
– Before the game starts, an initial state k1 is drawn according to p. The
quantity k1 is the initial state. Players do not know k1.
– At stage m≥ 1, both players choose an action simultaneously and inde-
pendently, im ∈ I (resp., jm ∈ J) for Player 1 (resp., 2). The payoff at
stage m is g(km, im, jm). A pair (km+1, am) is drawn from q(km, im, jm).
Both players receive the public signal am, which contains the actions im
and jm. The game moves on to state km+1, and then continues to the next
stage.
Compared to the model of general repeated game described in the
Introduction, when the game has symmetric information, one has am = bm
and (im, jm) is am-measurable for all m≥ 1, and the players do not receive
a signal at the outset of the game. The history of the game before stage m
is the random sequence (k1, i1, j1, a1, k2, . . . , im−1, jm−1, am−1, km).
The set of all possible histories before stage m is Hm :=K× (I×J ×A×
K)m−1.
The set of all possible plays is H∞ :=K × (I × J ×A×K)N∗ .
At the beginning of stage m, both players know (i1, j1, a1, . . . , im−1, jm−1,
am−1).
A pure strategy for Player 1 (resp., 2) is a map s :
⋃
m≥1(I×J×A)m−1 → I
[resp., t :
⋃
m≥1(I × J ×A)m−1 → J ].
A behavior strategy for Player 1 (resp., 2) is a map σ :
⋃
m≥1(I × J ×
A)m−1 →∆(I) [resp., τ :⋃m≥1(I × J × A)m−1 →∆(J)]. The set of all be-
havior strategies for Player 1 (resp., 2) is denoted Σ (resp., T ).
An initial probability p ∈∆(K) and a pair of (pure or behavior) strate-
gies (σ, τ) ∈ Σ × T naturally induce a probability measure Ppσ,τ on the set
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of all finite histories
⋃
m≥1Hm [for more details, see Sorin (2002), Ap-
pendix D]. By the Kolmogorov extension theorem, this probability measure
uniquely extends to H∞. We denote E
p
σ,τ the expectation with respect to
the probability measure Ppσ,τ . Let gm be the random payoff at stage m≥ 1:
gm := g(km, im, jm).
For λ ∈ (0,1], the λ-discounted game is the strategic-form game Γpλ with
strategy set Σ for Player 1 and T for Player 2, and payoff function γpλ :Σ×T →R defined by
γpλ(σ, τ) := E
p
σ,τ
(∑
m≥1
λ(1− λ)m−1gm
)
·
The goal of Player 1 (resp., 2) is to maximize (resp., minimize) γpλ.
For n ∈N∗, the n-stage repeated game is the strategic-form game Γpn with
strategy set Σ for Player 1 and T for Player 2, and payoff function γpn :Σ×
T →R defined by
γpn(σ, τ) := E
p
σ,τ
(
1
n
n∑
m=1
gm
)
·
The goal of Player 1 (resp., 2) is to maximize (resp., minimize) γpn.
The games Γpλ and Γ
p
n have a value, denoted, respectively, by vλ(p) and
vn(p) [see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994), Chapter IV]. That is, there are
real numbers vλ(p) and vn(p) satisfying
vλ(p) = max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γpλ(σ, τ) = minτ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
γpλ(σ, τ),
vn(p) = max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γpn(σ, τ) = min
τ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
γpn(σ, τ).
In the game Γpλ, a strategy σ
∗ ∈Σ (resp., τ∗ ∈ T ) is optimal if for all τ ∈ T
(resp., σ ∈ Σ) we have γλ(σ∗, τ) ≥ vλ(p) [resp., γλ(σ, τ∗) ≤ vλ(p)]. Optimal
strategies in Γpn are defined in the same way, replacing λ by n.
1.2. Asymptotic approach.
Definition 1.1. Γ has an asymptotic value if the sequences of functions
(vn) and (vλ) converge pointwise to the same limit (when n→ +∞ and
λ→ 0).
Remark 1.2. For all (n,λ) ∈N∗×(0,1], vn :∆(K)→R and vλ :∆(K)→
R are ‖g‖∞-Lipschitz [see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994), Chapter V,
page 184]. Thus, as far as these sequences are concerned, pointwise and
uniform convergence are equivalent. In what follows, we will simply write
“(vn) converges” or “(vλ) converges,” whenever these sequences of functions
converge pointwise.
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1.3. Equivalent repeated game with perfect observation of the state. Let
Γ be a repeated game with symmetric information. For m≥ 1, we denote pm
the conditional probability on the state km at stagem, given the random past
history of the players (i1, j1, a1, . . . , im−1, jm−1, am−1). The random variable
pm represents the common belief at stage m about the current state km.
The triplet (pm+1, im, jm) is the only relevant information conveyed by the
signal am, and pm plays the role of a state variable. Indeed, extend q and
g linearly to ∆(K)× I × J : q(p, i, j) :=∑k∈K p(k)q(k, i, j) and g(p, i, j) :=∑
k∈K p(k)g(k, i, j).
Assume that at some stage of the game, players have a common belief p
about the current state. If they play (i, j) and receive the signal a ∈A, then
their posterior belief about the next state will be q∆(K)|A(p, i, j, a) ∈∆(K),
where
∀k ∈K q∆(K)|A(p, i, j, a)(k) :=
q(p, i, j)(k, a)∑
k′∈K q(p, i, j)(k
′, a)
.
Let qA(p, i, j) ∈∆(A) be the marginal on A of q(p, i, j). We define q˜ :∆(K)×
I × J →∆f (∆(K)) by
q˜(p, i, j) :=
∑
a∈A
qA(p, i, j)(a) · q∆(K)|A(p, i, j, a).(1.1)
If players have a common belief p about the current state and play (i, j), then
for all a ∈A, their posterior belief about the next state will be q∆(K)|A(p, i, j, a)
with probability qA(p, i, j)(a).
Fix λ ∈ (0,1]. The function vλ :∆(K)→ R is the unique solution of the
following functional equation [see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994), Chapter
IV, Theorem 3.2, page 158]:
f(p) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
{λg(p,x, y) + (1− λ)Epx,y(f)}(1.2)
= min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)
{λg(p,x, y) + (1− λ)Epx,y(f)},(1.3)
where the unknown is a continuous function f :∆(K)→R,
E
p
x,y(f) :=
∑
(p′,i,j)∈∆(K)×I×J
x(i)y(j)q˜(p, i, j)(p′)f(p′)
and
g(p,x, y) :=
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
x(i)y(j)g(p, i, j).
The game that is equivalent to Γ is the repeated game Γ˜ with state space
∆(K), action sets I and J , transition function q˜ :∆(K)×I×J→∆f (∆(K))
and payoff function g.
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Given an initial state p ∈∆(K), the game Γ˜p proceeds as follows. Play-
ers know p, and at each stage m≥ 1, they choose an action simultaneously
and independently, im ∈ I (resp., jm ∈ J) for Player 1 (resp., 2). The pay-
off at stage m is g(pm, im, jm), and pm+1 is drawn from q˜(pm, im, jm), and
announced to both players. The game moves on to state pm+1, and then
continues to the next stage. Note that pm can only take a countable number
of values.
Given λ ∈ (0,1] and n ∈ N∗, the λ-discounted game Γ˜pλ and the n-stage
repeated game Γ˜pn are defined as in Section 1.1. The games Γ˜
p
λ (resp., Γ˜
p
n)
and Γpλ (resp., Γ
p
n) have the same value, and optimal strategies in the first
game induce optimal strategies in the second one, and vice versa.
Definition 1.3. A strategy in Γ˜ is stationary if it only depends on the
state variable pm. Such a strategy can be seen as a map from ∆(K) to ∆(I)
or ∆(J).
There exists stationary strategies which are optimal in Γ˜pλ for any p ∈
∆(K) [see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994), Chapter VII, Proposition 1.4,
page 326]. We have the following refinement, which follows from Shapley
(1953) and the compactness of ∆(K):
Definition 1.4. A player is said to control p ∈∆(K) if in this state
the transition q˜(p, ·) and the payoff g(p, ·) do not depend on the action of
the other player.
Lemma 1.5. Assume that each state in ∆(K) is controlled by one player.
Then both players have pure stationary strategies which are optimal in Γ˜pλ
for any p ∈∆(K).
2. A repeated game with symmetric information where (vλ) does not
converge. First we present the main counterexample of the paper. We then
describe the equivalent game with perfect observation of the state and ac-
tions. This game might seem intricate, but it turns out that for each discount
factor λ in (0,1], the discounted game is equivalent to a strategic-form game
with strategy sets N for Player 1 and 2N for Player 2. From the analysis of
this last game, we deduce that the discounted value of the main counterex-
ample does not converge.
2.1. Description of the example. Consider the following repeated game
with symmetric information Γ, with state space K = {1∗,1++,1T ,1+,0∗,
0++,0+}, action sets I = J = {C,Q}, and signal set A= {D,D′}. The payoff
function does not depend on the actions, and is equal to 1 in states 1∗, 1++,
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Fig. 1. Transitions in the game Γ.
1T and 1+, and to 0 in states 0∗, 0++ and 0+. Player 2 controls states 1++,
1T and 1+. Player 1 controls states 0++ and 0+. Lastly, states 1∗ and 0∗
are absorbing states: once 1∗ or 0∗ is reached, the game remains forever in
this state, and the payoff does not depend on the actions (absorbing payoff).
Figure 1 describes the transition function.
We have adopted the following notation: an arrow going from state k ∈K
to state k′ ∈K with the caption (i, p, a) ∈ {C,Q}× [0,1]×{D,D′} indicates
that if the player who controls state k plays action i, then with probability
p the state moves to state k′ and the signal is a. For example, if the state is
1++ and Player 2 plays action C, then with probability 1/2 the game moves
to state 1T and the signal is D, and with probability 1/2 the game stays in
state 1++ and the signal is D′.
The action Q causes absorption or switching from {1++,1T ,1+} to {0++,
0+} and vice versa. In particular, the players know in which of the following
subsets of K the current state is: {1++,1T ,1+}, {0++,0+}, {1∗} or {0∗}.
2.2. Equivalent repeated game with perfect observation. In this subsec-
tion, we give the exact expression of the transition function q˜ of the equiva-
lent repeated game with perfect observation of the state and actions Γ˜. We
denote by 12n, 12n+1, 0n ∈∆(K) (n ∈N∗) the possible beliefs of the players
along the game. Starting from the prior belief 0++, 0n is the belief after n
consecutive stages in which Player 1 played C and the signal was D; starting
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Fig. 2. Transitions in the states 12n and 12n+1.
from the prior belief 1++, 1n is the belief after n consecutive stages in which
Player 2 played C and the signal was D.
Formally, given n ∈N∗, we define the beliefs 12n,12n+1,0n ∈∆(K) by:
12n := 2
−2n · 1++ + (1− 2−2n) · 1+,
12n+1 := 2
−2n · 1T + (1− 2−2n) · 1+,
0n := 2
−n · 0++ + (1− 2−n) · 0+.
Let us suppose that at some stage of Γ, the belief of the players about
the current state is 1n, for some n ∈ N. Player 1’s action has no influence
on the transition and both players know it. If Player 2 plays C, then with
probability 1/2 the signal is D (resp., D′), and by Bayes rule the posterior
belief about the next state will be 1n+1 (resp., 10 = 1
++). Now let us suppose
that the belief is 12n or 12n+1. If he plays Q, then with probability 1− 2−2n
(resp., 2−2n) the signal is D (resp., D′), and the posterior belief about the
next state will be 0++ (resp., 1∗). Thus, in Γ˜, the transition function q˜ in
the states 12n and 12n+1 can be described by Figure 2.
Let us suppose that at some stage of Γ, the belief of the players about
the current state is 0n. Player 2’s action has no influence on the transition
and both players know it. If Player 1 plays C, then with probability 1/2 the
signal is D (resp., D′), and by Bayes rule the posterior belief about the next
state will be 0n+1 (resp., 00 = 0
++). Now let us suppose that the belief is
0n. If she plays Q, then with probability 1− 2−n (resp., 2−n) the signal is D
(resp., D′), and the posterior belief about the next state will be 1++ (resp.,
0∗). Thus, in Γ˜, the transition function q˜ in the state 0n can be described
by Figure 3.
Let P1 :=
⋃
n∈N{1n}, P0 :=
⋃
n∈N{0n}, and P = P1 ∪ P0 ∪ {1∗,0∗}. Note
that in Γ˜, Player 1 controls all the states in P0, and Player 2 controls all the
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Fig. 3. Transitions in the state 0n.
states in P1. The set of states which can be reached with positive probability
under some strategy vector in Γ˜1
++
is exactly P .
Now let us explain the dynamics of the game informally. Assume that
the game starts in state p= 00 = 0
++. Since the payoff is 1 in states lying
in P1 and 0 in states lying in P0, and since Player 1 maximizes the payoff,
Player 1 wants to go to state 10 = 1
++. If she plays Q immediately, the game
is absorbed in state 0∗, which is the worst state for her. If she never plays
Q, the payoff is 0 forever, which is also an unfavorable outcome for her. If
she plays C until the state is 0n, and then she plays Q, then the game is
absorbed in state 0∗ with probability 2−n (we will often call absorbing risk
taken by Player 1 the probability that the game is absorbed in state 0∗),
and the game goes to state 1++ with a probability of (1− 2−n).
To reach state 0n from state 0
++, Player 1 needs 2n stages on average.
Hence, Player 1 has to make a trade-off between staying not too long in
states of type 0, and having a low probability of being absorbed in 0∗ when
she plays Q. Basically, Player 1 needs to wait on average 2n stages to reduce
the absorbing risk to 2−n.
The same principle applies to Player 2. Assume that the game starts in
state p= 10 = 1
++. Player 2 plays C until reaching state 12n, and then Q.
The game is absorbed in state 1∗ with a probability of 2−2n, and it goes to
state state 0++ with a probability of (1− 2−2n).
To reach state 12n, Player 2 needs on average 2
2n stages. Player 2 can
also play Q in state 12n+1, but this is not a good strategy, since such a
state is harder to reach than state 12n (2
2n+1 stages on average) but leads
to the same absorbing risk 2−2n. Note that the time needed by Player 2 to
go from state 1++ to state 12n is on average the same as the time needed by
Player 1 to go from state 0++ to state 02n. The state of the game oscillates
between states of type 0 and states of type 1 as long as it does not reach
an absorbing state. The only asymmetry of the game is that Player 1 can
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take any absorbing risks of the form 2−n, whereas Player 2 can only take
absorbing risks of the form 2−2n.
2.3. Equivalent strategic-form game. Fix λ ∈ (0,1]. Let (a, b) ∈ N× 2N.
Let s(a) ∈Σ be the following pure stationary strategy for Player 1: for every
n≥ a, play Q in state 0n; otherwise play C.
Let t(b) ∈ T be the following pure stationary strategy for Player 2: for
every n≥ b, play Q in state 1n; otherwise play C.
The aim of this section is to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The game Γ˜pλ for p= 1
++ has the same value as the
strategic-form game Gλ with action set N for Player 1, 2N for Player 2, and
payoff function
gλ(a, b) :=
1− fλ(b)
1− fλ(a)fλ(b)
,(2.1)
where
fλ(n) :=
(1− 2−n)(1− λ2)
1 + 2n+1λ(1− λ)−n − λ.
Moreover, (a, b) ∈ N × 2N are optimal strategies in Gλ if and only if s(a)
and t(b) are optimal strategies in Γ˜1
++
λ .
Proof. First note that by Lemma 1.5, there exists pure optimal station-
ary strategies in Γ˜1
++
λ . A pure stationary strategy for Player 1 corresponds
to a strategy s(a), where a ∈ N is the smallest integer for which Player 1
plays Q in state 1a. Note that Player 2 is better off quitting in state 12n
rather than in state 12n+1. Indeed, state 12n+1 is harder to reach than state
12n, but the probability of being absorbed in state 1
∗ when playing Q is
the same in both states. Thus, Player 2 has an optimal strategy of the form
t(b), for some b ∈ 2N. Fix now a, b ∈N× 2N, and let us compute the payoff
γ1
++
λ (s(a), t(b)) given by these strategies.
Let Tb = inf{m≥ 1|jm =Q} and Ta = inf{m≥ Tb + 1|im =Q} − Tb. The
random variable Tb (resp., Ta) represents the time spent by Player 2 (resp.,
Player 1) in states of type 1 (resp., 0) before quitting. The payoff γ1
++
λ (s(a),
t(b)) is equal to
2−b + (1− 2−b)E
(
Tb∑
m=1
λ(1− λ)m−11 +
Ta+Tb∑
m=Tb+1
λ(1− λ)m−10
)
+ (1− 2−b)(1− 2−a)((1− λ)Ta+Tb)γ1++λ (s(a), t(b)),
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where E1
++
s(a),t(b) is denoted by E. The quantity 2
−b corresponds to the prob-
ability that the game is absorbed in state 1∗ when Player 2 plays Q: in this
case the payoff is 1 at every stage. If the game is not absorbed at that point,
then the payoff from stage 1 until the stage when Player 1 plays Q is the
second term of the equation. When Player 1 plays Q, the game is absorbed
in state 0∗ with probability 2−a, and goes back to state 1++ with probability
(1− 2−a); this is the third term of the equation.
We deduce that
γ1
++
λ (s(a), t(b)) =
1− (1− 2−b)E((1− λ)Tb)
1− (1− 2−a)(1− 2−b)E((1− λ)Ta+Tb) .(2.2)
Under s(a) and t(b), the stopping times Ta and Tb are independent. Thus,
we have
E((1− λ)Ta+Tb) = E((1− λ)Ta)E((1− λ)Tb) ·(2.3)
Under s(a) [resp., t(b)], Ta− 1 (resp., Tb− 1) is a random variable denoting
the number of trials needed to have a (resp., b) consecutive successes in
independent trials with a success probability of 1/2. Thus, this random
variable follows the generalized geometric distribution of order a (resp., b)
and parameter 1/2 studied in Philippou, Georghiou and Philippou (1983).
By Lemma 2.2 in Philippou, Georghiou and Philippou (1983), we get
E((1− λ)Tn) = (1 + λ)/(1 + 2n+1λ(1− λ)−n − λ).(2.4)
Combining (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), we get the desired result. 
2.4. Asymptotic study of Gλ and proof of the main theorem. We first
determine optimal strategies in Gλ.
Proposition 2.2. Let (a∗, b∗) ∈ argmaxn∈N fλ × argmaxn∈2N fλ. Then
a∗ (resp., b∗) is a dominant strategy for Player 1 (resp., 2) in Gλ. In par-
ticular, they are optimal strategies in Γ˜1
++
λ .
Proof. We have limn→+∞ fλ(n) = 0, therefore, a
∗ and b∗ are well de-
fined. Observe that the function (x, y)→ (1−y)(1−xy)−1, defined on [0,1)2,
is increasing in x for every fixed y, and decreasing in y for every fixed x, and
that fλ(N)⊂ [0,1). Hence, a∗ and b∗ are dominant strategies in Gλ, and by
Proposition 2.1 they are optimal strategies in Γ˜1
++
λ . 
Remark 2.3. The existence of dominant strategies in Gλ can be ex-
plained without any computation. Indeed, in Γ˜1
++
λ , the maximization prob-
lem faced by Player 2 does not depend on the payoff he receives once reaching
state 10, as long as this payoff is positive. Therefore, whichever stationary
strategy Player 1 chooses, the best-response for Player 2 is always the same.
The same argument applies to Player 1.
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To study fλ, it is convenient to make the change of variables r= 2
−n. Let
f̂λ : [0,1]→R be the function defined for r ∈ (0,1] by
f̂λ(r) := (1− r)(1 + 2λr−s − λ)−1,
where s := 1− ln(2)−1 ln(1− λ)> 1, and f̂λ(0) := 0. Note that for all n ∈N,
fλ(n) = (1− λ2)f̂λ(2−n).
Lemma 2.4. The function f̂λ reaches its maximum at a unique point
r∗(λ), is strictly increasing on [0, r∗(λ)], and strictly decreasing on [r∗(λ),1].
Moreover, for all c > 0,
f̂λ(c
√
2λ) =
λ→0
1− (c+ c−1)
√
2λ+ o(
√
λ)(2.5)
and
r∗(λ) ∼
λ→0
√
2λ.(2.6)
Proof. Differentiating f̂λ yields
f̂ ′λ(r) =
−(1 + 2λr−s − λ)− (1− r)(−2λsr−s−1)
(1 + 2λr−s − λ)2 .
The numerator of this expression is equal to hλ(r) := λ− 1+2λ(−(1+ s)r+
s)r−s−1. Note that
h′λ(r) =−2λ(s(1 + s)(1− r))r−s−2.
We have h′λ < 0 on (0,1), limr→0 hλ(r) = +∞, and hλ(1) =−(1 + λ). Hence
there exists r∗(λ) ∈ (0,1) such that hλ is strictly positive on (0, r∗(λ)], and
strictly negative on [r∗(λ),1]. Thus, f̂λ is strictly increasing on [0, r
∗(λ)],
and strictly decreasing on [r∗(λ),1].
If c > 0, we have
f̂λ(c
√
2λ) =
λ→0
1− (c+ c−1)
√
2λ+ o(
√
λ).
Let ε > 0. Applying the last relation to c = 1 − ε, c = 1, and c = 1 + ε
shows that for λ small enough, f̂λ(
√
2λ) > f̂λ((1− ε)
√
2λ) and f̂λ(
√
2λ)>
f̂λ((1+ ε)
√
2λ). Thus, for λ small enough, r∗(λ) ∈ [(1− ε)√2λ, (1+ ε)√2λ].
We deduce that r∗(λ) ∼
λ→0
√
2λ. 
We can now prove our main result.
Theorem 2.5. In Γ, (vλ) does not converge when λ goes to 0.
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Proof. We are going to show that the sequence (vλ(1
++)) does not
converge when λ goes to 0.
Set λm = 2
−4m−1 and µm = 2
−4m−3. Hence
√
2λm = 2
−2m and
√
2µm =
2−2m−1. By Lemma 2.4, for m large enough,
argmax
n∈N
fλm = argmax
n∈2N
fλm = {2m}.
Thus, for the discount factors (λm)m∈N, the fact that Player 1 has a wider
set of strategies than Player 2 does not affect the outcome of the game. By
Proposition 2.2, we have
vλm(1
++) = (1− fλm(2m))(1− fλm(2m)2)−1 = (1+ fλm(2m))−1.
By Lemma 2.4, (fλm(2m)) converges to 1 when m goes to infinity, thus
(vλm(1
++)) converges to 1/2.
By Lemma 2.4 again, for m large enough, we have
argmax
n∈N
fµm = {2m+1} and argmax
n∈2N
fµm ⊂ {2m,2m+ 2}.
Contrary to the previous situation, Player 1 has an advantage over her oppo-
nent: Player 2 cannot choose 2m+1. In Γ˜1
++
µm , choosing t(2m) or t(2m+2)
instead of t(2m + 1) changes the dynamics of the state, and makes this
advantage substantial. Formally, we have
vµm(1
++) =min
(
1− fµm(2m)
1− fµm(2m)fµm(2m+1)
,
1− fµm(2m+ 2)
1− fµm(2m+2)fµm(2m+1)
)
.
By Lemma 2.4, we have
fµm(2m+ 1) =m→+∞
1− 2
√
2µm + o(
√
µm),
fµm(2m) =
m→+∞
1− 5/2
√
2µm + o(
√
µm),
fµm(2m+ 2) =m→+∞
1− 5/2
√
2µm + o(
√
µm).
Hence,
1− fµm(2m)
1− fµm(2m)fµm(2m+1)
∼
m→+∞
5/2
√
2µm
(2 + 5/2)
√
2µm
= 5/9
and similarly
1− fµm(2m+ 2)
1− fµm(2m+2)fµm(2m+1)
∼
m→+∞
5/2
√
2µm
(2 + 5/2)
√
2µm
= 5/9.
The sequences (vλm(1
++)) and (vµm(1
++)) converge to different limits, hence
(vλ) does not converge. 
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Remark 2.6. More generally, for every initial state p ∈ P \ {1∗,0∗},
(vλ(p)) does not converge. Consider, for example, the case p= 0n, for some
n ∈N. Let N ≥ n. Consider the following strategy σ for Player 1 in Γ0nλ : play
C until pm = 0N , then play Q, and then play optimally in Γ
1++
λ if the state
1++ is reached. For λ small enough, the strategy σ guarantees vλ(1
++)−
2/N in Γ0nλ . We deduce that limλ→0 |vλ(0n)− vλ(1++)|= 0. With a similar
argument, one can show that for all (p, p′) ∈ P 2 \ {1∗,0∗}, limλ→0 |vλ(p)−
vλ(p
′)|= 0, which gives the result.
In this section, we have shown that Conjectures 1 and 2 are false, by
presenting an example of a repeated game with public signals and perfect
observation of the actions where (vλ) does not converge. In the following
section, we construct a repeated game belonging to the same class, where
neither (vλ) nor (vn) converge.
3. From (vλ) to (vn).
3.1. Motivation of the example. The idea of the construction of the game
is based on the following lemma, which can be deduced from the proof of
Sorin (2002), Theorem C.8, page 177. We provide the proof for completeness.
Lemma 3.1. Let Γ be any repeated game with symmetric information,
and p ∈ ∆(K). Let P ⊂ ∆(K) be the set of states which can be reached
with positive probability under some strategy vector in the game Γ˜p. Let
n0, n ∈ N∗, and for m ∈ N∗ set wm := v1/m. Let ‖ · ‖ denote the supremum
over P . Then the following inequality holds:
‖vn −wn‖ ≤ n0
n
‖vn0 −wn0‖+
n−1∑
m=n0
‖wm −wm+1‖.
Proof. Let m≥ 1 and p ∈ P . We have the following dynamic program-
ming principle [see Sorin (2002), Properties C.13, page 181]:
vm(p) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
{m−1g(p,x, y) + (m− 1)m−1Epx,y(vm−1)}(3.1)
= min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)
{m−1g(p,x, y) + (m− 1)m−1Epx,y(vm−1)}(3.2)
and
wm(p) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
{m−1g(p,x, y) + (m− 1)m−1Epx,y(wm)}(3.3)
= min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)
{m−1g(p,x, y) + (m− 1)m−1Epx,y(wm)}.(3.4)
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Let x∈∆(I) be optimal in (3.1) and y ∈∆(J) be optimal in (3.4). We have
vm(p)≤m−1g(p,x, y) + (m− 1)m−1Epx,y(vm−1),
wm(p)≥m−1g(p,x, y) + (m− 1)m−1Epx,y(wm).
The combination of these two inequalities gives
vm(p)−wm(p)≤ (m− 1)m−1‖vm−1 −wm‖.
Taking x′ ∈∆(I) optimal in (3.2) and y′ ∈∆(J) optimal in (3.3) gives the
symmetric inequality:
wm(p)− vm(p)≤ (m− 1)m−1‖vm−1 −wm‖.
Hence,
‖vm −wm‖ ≤ (m− 1)m−1‖vm−1 −wm‖
and
m‖vm −wm‖ ≤ (m− 1)‖vm−1 −wm−1‖+ (m− 1)‖wm−1 −wm‖.
Let n,n0 ≥ 1. Summing the last inequality from n0 +1 to n yields
n‖vn −wn‖ ≤ n0‖vn0 −wn0‖+
n−1∑
m=n0
m‖wm −wm+1‖.
Dividing by n gives the desired result. 
We construct a family of repeated games with symmetric information
(Γ(r))r≥1, such that the value (v
r
λ) of Γλ(r) does not converge. Moreover,
for all p ∈∆(K), the derivative function of vrλ(p) with respect to λ is bounded
by C(r)λ−1 for λ sufficiently small, where C(r)> 0 is independent of p and
goes to 0 as r goes to infinity. Applying Lemma 3.1, we are then able to
show that for r large enough, (vrn) does not converge.
3.2. Description of the game. Let r≥ 1. Consider the following repeated
game with symmetric information Γ(r). The state space is
K = {1++,1T1 ,1T2 , . . . ,1T2r−1 ,1+,1∗,0++,0T1 ,0T2 , . . . ,0Tr−1 ,0+,0∗},
the actions sets are I = J = {C,Q}, and the signal set is A= {D,D′}.
Payoffs are independent of actions, and are 1 in states belonging to {1∗,
1++,1T1 , . . . ,1T2r−1 ,1+}, and 0 in states belonging to {0∗,0++,0T1 , . . . ,0Tr−1 ,
0+}.
Player 2 controls the states 1++,1T1 , . . . ,1T2r−1 ,1+, and Player 1 controls
the states 0++,0T1 , . . . ,0Tr−1 ,0+. Hence, q can be seen as a map from K ×
{C,Q} to ∆(K×{D,D′}). Lastly, states 1∗ and 0∗ are absorbing states. The
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Fig. 4. Transitions in the states controlled by Player 1.
next figure describes the transitions in the state 0Tl , where l ∈ {0,1, . . . , r−
2}, and in the states 0Tr−1 , 0+ and 0∗ (by convention 0T0 := 0++). To simplify
Figure 4, the transitions in states 0T0 = 0++ and 0Tl+1 are not represented.
In the states controlled by Player 2, the transitions are analog: one re-
places 0 by 1 and r− 1 by 2r− 1 (with the convention 1T0 := 1++).
Remark 3.2. The case r = 1 corresponds to the example of Section 2.
We now argue that the game Γ˜(r) presents strong similarities with the
game Γ˜ introduced in Section 2. Let m ∈N and l ∈ {0,1, . . . , r− 1}.
Let 0mr+l := 2
−mr · 0Tl + (1− 2−mr) · 0+, and for l ∈ {0,1, . . . ,2r − 1} let
12mr+l := 2
−2mr · 1Tl + (1− 2−2mr) · 1+. Let
P :=
⋃
n∈N
{1n,0n} ∪ {1∗,0∗}.
The set P is the set of all states which can be reached with positive proba-
bility in Γ˜(r)1
++
(note that P has the same formal definition as the set P in
Section 2.2). Moreover, when a player plays C in some state p ∈ P , the tran-
sition is identical to the transition in our first example Γ˜ (see Section 2.2).
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When Player 1 (resp., 2) plays Q at state 0mr+l (resp., 12mr+l), the state is
absorbed in state 0∗ (resp., 1∗) with probability 2−mr (resp., 2−2mr). Thus
the only difference with Γ˜ is that in Γ˜(r), Player 1 can only take absorb-
ing risks in the set {2−mr,m ∈ N}, and Player 2 can only take absorbing
risks in the set {2−2mr,m ∈ N}. The next proposition is the equivalent of
Proposition 2.1, and its proof is identical.
Proposition 3.3. The game Γ˜(r)1
++
λ has the same value as the strategic-
form game Gλ(r), with action set rN for Player 1, 2rN for Player 2, and
payoff
grλ(a, b) := gλ(a, b),
where gλ is defined in (2.1). Moreover, optimal strategies in Gλ(r) induce
optimal strategies in Γ˜(r)1
++
λ .
3.3. Asymptotic study of Gλ(r). Let r≥ 2. For m≥ 1, let λm := 2−4mr−1
and µm := 2
−4mr−2r−1. Hence,
√
2λm = 2
−2mr and
√
2µm = 2
−(2m+1)r . Pro-
ceeding exactly the same way as in Section 2.4, we get the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.4.
lim
m→+∞
vrλm(1
++) = 1/2 and lim
m→+∞
vrµm(1
++) =
2r + 2−r
2r + 2−r +2
.
Sketch of proof. For m large enough, we have by Lemma 2.4
argmax
n∈rN
fλm = argmax
n∈2rN
fλm = {2mr}.
We deduce (see the proof of Theorem 2.5) that (vrλm)(1
++) converges to
1/2. By Lemma 2.4 once again, for m large enough, we have
argmax
n∈rN
fµm = {(2m+1)r}
and
argmax
n∈2rN
fµm ⊂ {2mr,2(m+1)r}.
We deduce (see the proof of Theorem 2.5) that vrµm(1
++) converges to (2r+
2−r)/(2r +2−r + 2). 
We now use Lemma 3.1 to show that the value (vrn) of the game Γ(r)n
does not converge. We adopt the following notation: if (λ, p) ∈ (0,1]×∆(K),
we call (vrλ)
′(p) the derivative of vrλ(p) with respect to λ, evaluated in λ.
Analogously, f ′λ(p) is the derivative of fλ with respect to λ, evaluated in λ.
The following lemma gives a majorization of (vrλ)
′(p) on certain subinter-
vals.
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Lemma 3.5. There exists m0 ≥ 1 such that for all m≥m0, there exists
µ0m ∈ [µm,2r/2−1µm] such that for all p ∈ P and for all µ ∈ [µm,2r/2−1µm] \
{µ0m}, vrµ(p) is differentiable at µ and
|(vrµ)′(p)| ≤ 2−r/2µ−1,(3.5)
and for all λm ≤ λ≤ 2r−1λm, vrλ(p) is differentiable at λ and
|(vrλ)′(p)| ≤ 2r/2+2λ−1/2.(3.6)
Proof. We start by proving inequality (3.5). The proof proceeds in
three steps.
Step 1 [Computation of vrµ(1
++)]. By Lemma 2.4, there exists m1 ∈N∗
such that for all m≥m1 and µ ∈ [µm,2r/2−1µm],
argmax
n∈rN
fµ = {2mr+ r}.
Hence, for such m and µ, a(µ) := 2mr+ r is an optimal strategy for Player 1
in Gµ(r).
By Lemma 2.4 once again, there exists m2 ∈N∗ such that for all m≥m2,
there exists µ0m ∈ [µm,2r/2−1µm] such that for all µ ∈ (µ0m,2r/2−1µm]
argmax
n∈2rN
fµ = {2mr},
and for all µ ∈ [µm, µ0m)
argmax
n∈2rN
fµ = {2mr+2r}.
Hence, for all m≥m2 and µ ∈ (µ0m,2r/2−1µm], the integer b1(µ) := 2mr
is an optimal strategy for Player 2 in Gµ(r), and for all µ ∈ [µm, µ0m), the
integer b2(µ) := 2mr+2r is an optimal strategy for Player 2 in Gµ(r). Thus,
for all m≥max(m1,m2) :=m3 and µ ∈ (µ0m,2r/2−1µm], we have
vrµ(1
++) = gλ(a(µ), b1(µ))
(3.7)
= [1− fλ(b1(µ))][1− fλ(a(µ))fλ(b1(µ))]−1,
and for µ ∈ [µm, µ0m)
vrµ(1
++) = gλ(a(µ), b2(µ))
(3.8)
= [1− fλ(b2(µ))][1− fλ(a(µ))fλ(b2(µ))]−1.
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Step 2 [Asymptotic expansion of (vrµ)
′(1++) as µ→ 0]. Fix m≥m3 and
µ ∈ (µ0m,2r/2−1µm]. Define C1 : (0,1]→R∗+ and C2 : (0,1]→R∗+ by
C1(µ) := 2
−2mr−r(2µ)−1/2 = (µm)
1/2µ−1/2(3.9)
and
C2(µ) := 2
−2mr(2µ)−1/2 = 2r(µm)
1/2µ−1/2 ·(3.10)
Note that 2−a(µ) = C1(µ)
√
2µ and 2−b1(µ) = C2(µ)
√
2µ. Moreover,
1≤ ‖C1‖∞ ≤ 2r and 2r ≤ ‖C2‖∞ ≤ 22r. The last two inequalities show that
the functions C1 and C2 are bounded and bounded away from 0, which will
be useful in the following asymptotic expansions.
Since the functions λ→ a(λ) and λ→ b1(λ) are constant on (µ0m,2r/2−1µm],
λ→ fλ(a(λ)) and λ→ fλ(b1(λ)) are differentiable at µ, and we have
f ′µ(a(µ)) = (1− 2−a(µ))(1 + 2a(µ)+1µ(1− µ)−a(µ) − µ)−2
× [−2µ(1 + 2a(µ)+1µ(1− µ)−a(µ) − µ)
− (1− µ2)(2a(µ)+1[(1− µ)−a(µ) − a(µ)µ(1− µ)a(µ)−1]− 1)].
We deduce that
f ′µ(a(µ)) =
µ→0
−2C1(µ)−1(2µ)−1/2 + o(µ−1/2),(3.11)
and likewise
f ′µ(b1(µ)) =
µ→0
−2C2(µ)−1(2µ)−1/2 + o(µ−1/2).(3.12)
The same computation as in Lemma 2.4 gives
fµ(a(µ)) =
µ→0
1− (C1(µ) +C1(µ)−1)(2µ)1/2 + o(µ1/2),
fµ(b1(µ)) =
µ→0
1− (C2(µ) +C2(µ)−1)(2µ)1/2 + o(µ1/2).
Now we differentiate vrµ(1
++) in (3.7) (we omit the dependence of a and b1
on µ). The derivative (vrµ)
′(1++) = g′µ(a, b1) is equal to
−f ′µ(b1)(1− fµ(a)fµ(b1)) + (1− fµ(b1))(f ′µ(a)fµ(b1) + fµ(a)f ′µ(b1))
(1− fµ(a)fµ(b1))2
=
f ′µ(a)fµ(b1)(1− fµ(b1))− f ′µ(b1)(1− fµ(a))
(1− fµ(a)fµ(b1))2 .
When µ goes to 0, the numerator of this expression is (we omit the depen-
dence on µ)
−2C−11 (C2 +C−12 ) + 2C−12 (C1 +C−11 ) + o(1) = 2(C−12 C1 −C−11 C2) + o(1).
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Hence,
(vrµ)
′(1++) =
µ→0
(C−12 C1 −C−11 C2)
(C1 +C
−1
1 +C2 +C
−1
2 )
2
µ−1 + o(µ−1).
Since µ≤ 2r/2−1µm, we have∣∣∣∣ (C−12 C1 −C−11 C2)(C1 +C−11 +C2 +C−12 )2
∣∣∣∣≤C−11 C−12 = 2−r µµm ≤ 2−r/2−1.
The last two relations show that for m large enough and µ0m <µ≤ 2r/2−1µm
|(vrµ)(1++)| ≤ 2−r/2−1µ−1.(3.13)
Equation (3.8) and similar computations show that the last inequality is
also true for m large enough and µ ∈ [µm, µ0m).
Step 3 [Computation of (vrµ)
′(p) for p ∈ P and proof of inequality (3.5)].
For a ∈ N and n≤ a, let T na be the random time needed by Player 1 to go
from state 0n to state 0a, when she plays strategy s(a). Let m ≥m3 and
µ ∈ (µ0m,2r/2−1µm].
If n< a(µ), then
vrµ(0n) = (1− 2−a(µ))E((1− µ)T
n
a(µ)
+1
)vrµ(1
++).(3.14)
If n≥ a(µ), then
vrµ(0n) = (1− 2−n)(1− µ)vrµ(1++).(3.15)
Thus, for all n ∈N
|(vrµ)′(0n)| ≤ E(T na(µ) +1) + |(vrµ)′(1++)|
(3.16)
≤ E(Ta(µ)) + |(vrµ)′(1++)|.
Similar arguments lead to
|vrµ(1n)| ≤ E(Tb1(µ)) + |(vrµ)′(0++)|.(3.17)
By (2.4), E(Ta(µ)) = o(µ
−1) and E(Tb1(µ)) = o(µ
−1) when µ goes to 0.
Combining inequalities (3.13), (3.16) and (3.17), we get inequality (3.5)
for m large enough and µ ∈ (µ0m,2r/2−1µm]. For m large enough and µ ∈
(µm, µ
0
m], the computations are similar.
Let us now prove inequality (3.6). By Lemma 2.4, there exists m4 ∈ N∗
such that for all λ ∈ [λm,2r−1λm], a(λ) := 2mr is an optimal strategy for
both players in Gλ(r), and
(vrλ)
′(1++) =− fλ(a(λ))
′
(1 + fλ(a(λ)))2
.
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For m≥m4 and λ ∈ [λm,2r−1λm], let C(λ) :=
√
λm
λ . Then as in (3.11)
f ′λ(a(λ)) =
λ→0
−2C(λ)−1(2λ)−1/2 + o(λ−1/2).
Since C(λ)−1 ≤ 2(r−1)/2 and fλ(a(λ)) goes to 1 when λ goes to 0, we get
inequality (3.6) for (vrλ)
′(1++) and it extends to (vrλ)
′(p) with the method
used in Step 3. 
Theorem 3.6. There exists r0 ∈ N∗ such that for all r ≥ r0, (vrn) and
(vrλ) do not converge.
Proof. Let r≥ 2. Recall that from Proposition 3.4,
lim
m→+∞
vrλm(1
++) = 1/2 and lim
m→+∞
vrµm(1
++) =
2r +2−r
2r +2−r + 2
:=w(r).
In particular, (vrλ) does not converge. We are going to show that for r big
enough, (vrn(1
++)) does not converge.
Let m0 be as in Lemma 3.5 and let m≥m0. Let n(m) := µ−1m = 24mr+2r+1
and n0(m) := 2
−⌊r/2⌋+1n(m). We now compare vrn(m) and v
r
µm . Using Lemma
3.1, we get
‖vrn(m) − vrµm‖ ≤
n0(m)
n(m)
‖vrn0(m) − vr2⌊r/2⌋−1µm‖+
n(m)−1∑
m′=n0(m)
‖vr1/m′ − vr1/(m′+1)‖.
Since the payoff function is bounded by 1, we have
n0(m)
n(m)
‖vrn0(m) − vr2⌊r/2⌋−1µm‖ ≤ 2
−⌊r/2⌋+1.
By inequality (3.5) in Lemma 3.5 and the mean value theorem, we have
n(m)−1∑
m′=n0(m)
‖vr1/m′ − vr1/(m′+1)‖ ≤ 2−r/2+1
n(m)−1∑
m′=n0(m)
∫ 1/m′
1/(m′+1)
1
x
dx
= 2−r/2+1
∫ (n0(m))−1
(n(m))−1
1
x
dx
= 2−r/2+1(⌊r/2⌋ − 1).
Letting m going to infinity, we deduce that
lim sup
n→+∞
vrn(1
++)≥w(r)− 2−⌊r/2⌋+1 − 2−r/2+1(⌊r/2⌋ − 1).
Note that limr→+∞w(r) = 1 and that the term on the right goes to 0 when
r goes to infinity.
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Lemma 3.1 for n(m) := λ−1m and n0(m) := 2
−⌊r/2⌋+1n(m) gives also an
inequality of the form
lim inf
n→+∞
vrn(1
++)≤ 1/2 + t(r),
where limr→+∞ t(r) = 0. Hence, for r large enough, (v
r
n(1
++)) does not con-
verge, thus (vrn) does not converge. 
We have proved in this section that in a repeated game with symmetric
information, the value of the n-stage repeated game might not converge.
To do so, we have exploited the very flexible structure of the first example
of Section 2. Indeed, we have managed to slow down the oscillations of vλ,
without changing much the dynamics of the game.
In the next section, we again take advantage of the flexibility of the game,
to provide other examples of repeated games without an asymptotic value.
4. Extension to other classes of repeated games.
4.1. State-blind repeated games. Consider the following state-blind re-
peated game Γ, with state space K = {1∗,1++,1T ,1+,0∗,0++,0+}, action
sets I = {T,B,Q} for Player 1 and J = {L,R,Q} for Player 2. The states 0∗
and 1∗ are absorbing states. The payoff is 1 in states 1++, 1T , 1+ and 1∗,
and 0 in states 0++, 0+ and 0∗. The transitions are described in Tables 1–5.
Recall that in this model, the players do not observe any signal about the
state, and only observe past actions.
The idea of this example is to artificially recreate the dynamics of the
example of Section 2, replacing signals by the mixed actions of one player.
Table 1
State 1++
L R Q
T 1++ 1T 1∗
B 1T 1++ 1∗
Q 0∗ 0∗ 0∗
Table 2
State 1T
L R Q
T 1++ 3/4 · 1+ + 1/4 · 1++ 1∗
B 3/4 · 1+ + 1/4 · 1++ 1++ 1∗
Q 0∗ 0∗ 0∗
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Table 3
State 1+
L R Q
T 1++ 1+ 0++
B 1+ 1++ 0++
Q 0∗ 0∗ 0∗
Table 4
State 0++
L R Q
T 1/2 · 0++ + 1/2 · 0+ 0++ 1∗
B 0++ 1/2 · 0++ +1/2 · 0+ 1∗
Q 0∗ 0∗ 1∗
Table 5
State 0+
L R Q
T 0+ 0++ 1∗
B 0++ 0+ 1∗
Q 1++ 1++ 1∗
Formally, let a∗(λ) [resp., b∗(λ)] be defined as in Proposition 2.2.
Let σ∗ ∈Σ be the following strategy for Player 1 in Γ1++λ : play 1/2 · T +
1/2 ·B if P(km = 0+|km /∈ {0∗,1∗})≤ 1− 2−a∗(λ), otherwise play Q.
Let τ∗ ∈ T be the following strategy for Player 2: play 1/2 ·L+1/2 ·R if
P(km = 1
+|km /∈ {0∗,1∗})≤ 1− 2−b∗(λ), otherwise play Q.
Proceeding as in Section 2, one can show that σ∗ and τ∗ are optimal
strategies, respectively, for Player 1 and 2 in Γ1
++
λ . Moreover, the probability
measure on the histories of the game induced by these strategies is the same
as the probability measure induced by s(a∗(λ)) and t(b∗(λ)) in the example
of Section 2. In particular, the two examples have the same discounted value,
thus (vλ(1
++)) does not converge.
4.2. Repeated games with one informed player. We now investigate a
repeated game with perfect observation of the actions, where Player 2 is
fully informed about the state, while Player 1 has no information about it.
As usual, both players observe past actions.
The state space is K = {1∗,1,0∗,0++,0+}, action sets are I = {T,B,Q}
for Player 1 and J = {L,R} for Player 2. The states 0∗ and 1∗ are absorbing
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Table 6
State 1
L R
T 1 0++
B 0++ 1∗
Q 0∗ 0∗
Table 7
State 0++
L R
T 1/2 · 0++ + 1/2 · 0+ 0++
B 0++ 1/2 · 0++ +1/2 · 0+
Q 0∗ 0∗
Table 8
State 0+
L R
T 0+ 0++
B 0++ 0+
Q 1 1
states. The payoff is 1 in states 1 and 1∗, and 0 in states 0++, 0+ and 0∗.
The transitions are described in the following Tables 6–8.
Compared to the game of Section 4.1, states 1++, 1T and 1+ have been
replaced by a single state 1, which is similar to the state ω+ in Vigeral
(2013). The other states have not been changed.
Let σ∗ be the following strategy for Player 1: in state 1, play (1−
√
λ) ·
T +
√
λ ·B, and when the belief is in ∆({0++,0+}), play the same strategy
as in the preceding example.
Let τ∗ be the following strategy for Player 2: in state 1, play (1−√λ) ·
L+
√
λ ·R, and in states 0++ and 0+, play (1/2 ·L+1/2 ·R). Proceeding the
same way as in Section 2, one can show that σ∗ and τ∗ are asymptotically
optimal strategies in Γ1λ, and that (vλ(1)) does not converge.
4.3. Stochastic games with compact action sets. We now study a re-
peated game with perfect observation (states and actions are known by both
players) but where I and J are compact. As mentioned in the Introduction,
this example does not relate to the two conjectures, because I and J are not
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finite. But it yields a simpler alternative counterexample to Vigeral (2013).
This example is similar to the example of Section 2 in terms of dynamics.
The state space is K = {1∗,1,0∗,0}, and actions sets are I = [0,1] and
J = {0} ∪⋃m∈N 4−m. The transition q is defined by
q(1, x, y) := (1− y) · 1 + (y− y2) · 0 + y2 · 1∗,
q(0, x, y) := (1− x) · 0 + (x− x2) · 1 + x2 · 0∗.
Hence, Player 1 controls state 0 and Player 2 controls state 1.
Let λ ∈ (0,1]. A pure stationary strategy in Γλ for Player 1 (resp., 2) can
be seen as an element of I (resp., J).
Remark 4.1. The real number x ∈ I corresponds to the absorbing risk
2−a in the example of Section 2. Indeed, when Player 1 plays x in state 0, she
waits on average x−1 stages before switching to state 1, and the probability
of absorbing in 0∗ before reaching state 1 is approximately x. Recall that in
the example of Section 2, when Player 1 plays a ∈N, she waits on average 2a
stages before quitting, and when she plays Q the game is absorbed in state
0∗ with probability 2−a. It is the same for Player 2. As in our first example,
Player 2 cannot take any absorbing risk: only y = 4−m for some m ∈ N, or
y = 0. But Player 1 can take any absorbing risk in [0,1]. That is why we
expect (vλ) to oscillate, just as in the first example.
The payoff in Γ1λ given by a pair of strategies (x, y) ∈ I × J is
γ1λ(x, y) =
(1− (1− λ)(1− y2))(1− (1− λ)(1− x))
(1− (1− λ)(1− xy))(1− (1− λ)(1− x)(1− y)) .
For any x ∈ [0,1] (resp., y ∈ [0,1]) γ1λ(x, ·) [resp., γ1λ(·, y)] is convex (resp.,
concave) and reaches its minimum (resp., its maximum) at y∗ (resp., x∗)
such that
x∗ = y∗ = (
√
λ− λ)(1− λ)−1.
For m ≥ 1, we define λm := 2−2m and µm := 2−2m−1. Then for m large
enough, xm = ym =
√
λm are asymptotically optimal strategies in Γ
1
λm
. Thus,
lim
m→+∞
vλm(1) = limm→+∞
γ1λm(xm, ym) = 1/2.
For m large enough, xm =
√
µm is an asymptotically optimal strategy
for Player 1 in Γ1µm , and either ym = 2
√
µm or y
′
m = 1/2
√
µm is an optimal
strategy for Player 2 in Γ1µm . We have
lim
m→+∞
γ1µm(xm, ym) = limm→+∞
γ1µm(xm, y
′
m) = 5/9.
Thus, limm→+∞ vµm(1) = 5/9, and (vλ(1)) does not converge.
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